The Big Short – How Wall Street Destroyed Main Street
Jim Quinn
Day after day,
bankers have been paraded before Congressional committees regarding
their role in the financial crisis which brought the financial system
to the edge of the abyss on September 18, 2008. Every one has claimed
that they were not responsible in any way for the disaster. They
blame once in a lifetime circumstances that no one could have anticipated.
It was a perfect storm and they had no way of knowing. These Harvard
MBA Wall Street geniuses, who collected compensation in excess of
$100 million each before the collapse, had no idea what was going
on within their own firms. Ignorance and stupidity is no excuse
for losing a trillion dollars. The truth is that the CEO's of all
the Wall Street banks encouraged a casino culture of greed and gambling.
The generation of fees became the sole driving incentive for every
firm. It started with collateralizing subprime mortgages into packages
of mortgage-backed securities. Then they created Credit Default
Swaps as insurance on these mortgages. When they ran out of chumps
to put into houses, they created side bets with Credit Default Obligations
that didn't require an actual homeowner.
The fees generated
by creating this crap were incomprehensible. The Masters of the
Universe were taking home pay packages of $25 million and weren't
satisfied. They only made one small mistake. They deluded themselves
into thinking the crap they were selling to suckers wasn't actually
crap. They ended up buying their own toxic paper. Even though they
knew that the ratings agencies were basically whoring out AAA ratings
for fees, they believed that AAA-rated securities they were buying
and insuring weren't actually worthless. They didn't understand
that they had created Frankenderivatives. Author Michael Lewis has
done a fantastic job making this sordid tale of greed understandable
to the common person.
You are probably
thinking that the title of this article is strange, but you will
understand in a few minutes. Michael Lewis wrote the classic Wall
Street book about the greed of the 1980's Liar's
Poker, published in 1989. He detailed the absurdity and
greed of Wall Street from his firsthand experiences working at Salomon
Brothers fresh out of college. He captured the destructive culture
of Wall Street in a very funny 290-page classic. He immortalized
the term Big Swinging Dick regarding Salomon ("If he could make
millions of dollars come out of those phones, he became that most
revered of all species: a Big Swinging Dick."). He also described
the act of Blowing up a customer: successfully convincing a customer
to purchase an investment product which ends up declining rapidly
in value, forcing the client to withdraw from the market.
He described
an old mortgage bond trader named Donnie Green who once stopped
a young callow salesman on his way out the door to catch a flight
from New York to Chicago. Green tossed the salesman a ten-dollar
bill. "Hey, take out some crash insurance for yourself in my name,"
he said. "Why?" asked the salesman. "I feel lucky," said Green.
Some other memorable snippets included:
- The larger
the number of people involved, the easier it was for them to delude
themselves that what they were doing must be smart. The first
thing you learn on the trading floor is that when large numbers
of people are after the same commodity, be it a stock, a bond,
or a job, the commodity quickly becomes overvalued.
- In any market,
as in any poker game, there is a fool. The astute investor Warren
Buffet is fond of saying that any player unaware of the fool in
the market probably is the fool in the market.
- The firm's
management created a training programme, filled it to the brim,
then walked away. In the ensuing anarchy the bad drove out the
good, the big drove out the small, and the brawn drove out the
brains.
- Whenever
calculus is brought in, or higher algebra, you could take it as
a warning signal that the operator was trying to substitute theory
for experience.
- The only
thing that history teaches us, a wise man once said, is that history
doesn't teach us anything.
- That was
how a Salomon bond trader thought: he forgot whatever it was that
he wanted to do for a minute and put his finger on the pulse of
the market. If the market felt fidgety, if people were scared
or desperate, he herded them like sheep into a corner, then made
them pay for their uncertainty. He sat on the market until it
puked gold coins. Then he worried about what he wanted to do.
- Stupid customers
(the fools in the market) were a wonderful asset, but at some
level of ignorance they became a liability - they went broke.
Michael expected
that his book would convince many smart college students to pass
on Wall Street and pursue worthwhile careers. Instead he was bombarded
with fan mail thanking him for making Wall Street seem so appealing.
The unquenchable desire for millions in compensation and unfettered
greed on Wall Street only grew during the two decades since his
book.
He has now
book-ended two decades of greed with his latest masterpiece The
Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. He was able to link
the two books by interviewing John Gutfreund, his former boss at
Salomon Brothers, at the end of his new book. Lewis is able to explain
the most recent financial crisis caused by Wall Street through the
eyes of a few oddball skeptics. It is a truly enlightening book
and reveals the true nature of the Wall Street mega-banks. Lewis
summarizes the big picture in the following sequence:
By early
2005, the sub-prime mortgage machine was up and running again. If
the first act of sub-prime lending had been freaky, this second
act was terrifying. $30bn was a big year for sub-prime lending in
the mid-1990s. In 2005 there would be $625bn in sub-prime mortgage
loans, $507bn of which found its way into mortgage bonds. Even more
shocking was that the terms of the loans were changing in ways that
increased the likelihood they would go bad. Back in 1996, 65% of
sub-prime loans had been fixed-rate. By 2005, 75% were some form
of floating rate, usually fixed for the first two years.
By the time
Greg Lippmann, the head sub-prime guy at Deutsche Bank, turned up
in the FrontPoint conference room, in February 2006, Steve Eisman
knew enough about the bond market to be wary. Lippmann's aim was
to sell Eisman on what he claimed was his own original brilliant
idea for betting against - or short selling - the sub-prime mortgage
bond market.
Eisman didn't
understand. Lippmann wasn't even a bond salesman; he was a bond
trader: "In my entire life, I never saw a sell-side guy come
in and say, ‘Short my market.'" But Lippmann made his case
with a long and involved presentation: over the last three years,
housing prices had risen far more rapidly than they had over the
previous 30; they had not yet fallen but they had ceased to rise;
even so, the loans against them were now going sour in their first
year at amazing rates.
He showed
Eisman this little chart that illustrated an astonishing fact: since
2000, people whose homes had risen in value between 1% and 5% were
nearly four times more likely to default on their home loans than
people whose homes had risen in value more than 10%. Millions of
Americans had no ability to repay their mortgages unless their houses
rose dramatically in value, which enabled them to borrow even more.
That was the pitch in a nutshell: home prices didn't even need to
fall; they merely needed to stop rising at the unprecedented rates
they had been for vast numbers of Americans to default on their
home loans.
Lippmann's
presentation was just a fancy way to describe the idea of betting
against US home loans: buying credit default swaps on the crappiest
sub-prime mortgage bonds. The beauty of the credit default swap,
or CDS, was that it solved the timing problem. Eisman no longer
needed to guess exactly when the sub-prime mortgage market would
crash. It also allowed him to make the bet without laying down cash
up front, and put him in a position to win many times the sums he
could possibly lose. Worst case: insolvent Americans somehow paid
off their sub-prime mortgage loans, and you were stuck paying an
insurance premium of roughly 2% a year for as long as six years
- the longest expected life span of the putatively 30-year loans.
Eisman could
imagine very little that would give him so much pleasure as going
to bed each night, possibly for the next six years, knowing he was
shorting a financial market he'd come to know and despise, and was
certain would one day explode.
In the summer
of 2006, house prices peaked and began to fall. For the entire year
they would fall, nationally, by 2%. By that autumn, Lippmann had
made his case to hundreds more investors. Yet only 100 or so dabbled
in the new market for credit default swaps on sub-prime mortgage
bonds. A smaller number of people still - more than 10, fewer than
20 - made a straightforward bet against the entire multi-trillion-dollar
sub-prime mortgage market and, by extension, the global financial
system. The catastrophe was foreseeable, yet only a handful noticed.
Eisman was
odd in his conviction that the leveraging of middle-class America
was a corrupt and corrupting event. At the annual sub-prime conference
that year, Eisman walked around the Venetian hotel in Las Vegas
- with its penny slots and cash machines that spat out $100 bills
- and felt depressed. It was overrun by thousands of white men now
earning their living, one way or another, off sub-prime mortgages.
Later, whenever
Eisman set out to explain to others the origins of the financial
crisis, he would start with what he learned in Las Vegas. He'd draw
a picture of several towers of debt. The first tower was the original
sub-prime loans that had been piled together. At the top of this
tower was the safest triple-A rated tranche, just below it the double-A
tranche, and so on down to the riskiest, triple-B tranche - the
bonds Eisman had bet against. The Wall Street firms had taken these
triple-B tranches - the worst of the worst - to build yet another
tower of bonds: a collateralized debt obligation. Like the credit
default swap, the CDO had been invented to redistribute the risk
of corporate and government bond defaults, and was now being rejigged
to disguise the risk of sub-prime mortgage loans.
It was in
Vegas that Eisman finally understood the madness of the machine.
He'd been making these side bets with major investment banks on
the fate of the triple-B tranche of sub-prime mortgage-backed bonds
without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to accept
them. Now he got it: the credit default swaps, filtered through
the CDOs, were being used to replicate bonds backed by actual home
loans. There weren't enough Americans with shitty credit taking
out loans to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product. Wall
Street needed his bets in order to synthesize more of them. "They
weren't satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow
money to buy a house they couldn't afford," Eisman says. "They
were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That's
why the losses in the financial system are so much greater than
just the sub-prime loans. That's when I realized they needed us
to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?"
It was in
Las Vegas that Eisman and his associates' attitude toward the US
bond market hardened into something like its final shape. The question
lingering at the back of their minds ceased to be, do these bond
market people know something we do not? It was replaced by, do they
deserve merely to be fired, or should they be put in jail? Are they
delusional, or do they know what they're doing?
On the surface,
these big Wall Street firms appeared robust; below the surface,
Eisman was beginning to think, their problems might not be confined
to a potential loss of revenue. He'd go to meetings with Wall Street
CEOs and ask them the most basic questions: "They didn't know
their own balance sheets."
I now have
a new hero to worship. His name is Steve Eisman. He is a total prick.
Whenever he opens his mouth in public, his two associates - Vincent
Daniel and Danny Moses, sink down in their seats in anticipation
of him saying something truly outrageous and true. In this book
Lewis details how a few skeptical oddball guys figured out that
the subprime mortgage market was the scam of the century and tried
desperately to call attention to what was happening. The fact that
they got unbelievably rich in the process is really secondary to
the story of corruption, greed and stupidity by Wall Street bankers,
the ratings agencies Moody's and S&P, the SEC, and the American
homeowners.
The subprime
mortgage market was miniscule during the 1990's. Steve Eisman, Michael
Burry, and 3 guys named Charlie Ledley, Jamie Mai, and Ben Hockett
operating out of a garage with $1 million, figured out independently
from each other that as the 2000's progressed an immense bubble
of bad debt was being created. The question was how could they take
advantage of their discovery.
Eisman had
a disdain for the companies in the subprime mortgage industry because
he knew they were taking advantage of ignorant poor people. Household
Finance was peddling these misleading loans and the CEO sold out
to HSBC before the disaster struck. Eisman said, "It was engaged
in blatant fraud. They should have taken the CEO out and hung him
up by his fucking testicles. Instead they sold the company and the
CEO made a hundred million dollars." After this he made it his life's
mission to expose the fraud in this market.
Vinny Daniel
was Eisman's analyst and Danny Moses was his trader. Vinny was from
Queens and trusted no one. Eisman described him as "Very dark." He dug into the transaction details and fed the info to Steve. Danny
didn't trust anyone on Wall Street.
When a Wall
Street firm helped him to get into a trade that seemed perfect in
every way, he asked the salesman, "I appreciate this, but I just
want to know one thing: How are you going to f**k me?"
Heh-heh-heh,
c'mon, we'd never do that, the trader started to say, but Danny,
though perfectly polite, was insistent. "We both know that unadulterated
good things like this trade don't just happen between little hedge
funds and big Wall Street firms. I'll do it, but only after you
explain to me how you are going to fuck me." And the salesman explained
how he was going to fuck him. And Danny did the trade.
Eisman and
his colleagues did real due diligence on the market. They flew around
the country, attended subprime conferences and grilled CEOs and
the ratings agencies. Lewis detailed these efforts in the book:
Moses actually
flew down to Miami and wandered around neighborhoods built with
subprime loans to see how bad things were. "He'd call me and
say, ‘Oh my God, this is a calamity here,' " recalls Eisman.
All that was required for the BBB bonds to go to zero was for the
default rate on the underlying loans to reach 14 percent. Eisman
thought that, in certain sections of the country, it would go far,
far higher.
The funny
thing, looking back on it, is how long it took for even someone
who predicted the disaster to grasp its root causes. They were learning
about this on the fly, shorting the bonds and then trying to figure
out what they had done. Eisman knew subprime lenders could be scumbags.
What he underestimated was the total unabashed complicity of the
upper class of American capitalism. For instance, he knew that the
big Wall Street investment banks took huge piles of loans that in
and of themselves might be rated BBB, threw them into a trust, carved
the trust into tranches, and wound up with 60 percent of the new
total being rated AAA.
But he couldn't
figure out exactly how the rating agencies justified turning BBB
loans into AAA-rated bonds. "I didn't understand how they were
turning all this garbage into gold," he says. He brought some
of the bond people from Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and UBS
over for a visit. "We always asked the same question,"
says Eisman. "Where are the rating agencies in all of this?
And I'd always get the same reaction. It was a smirk." He called
Standard & Poor's and asked what would happen to default rates
if real estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldn't say; its
model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number.
"They were just assuming home prices would keep going up," Eisman says.
As an investor,
Eisman was allowed on the quarterly conference calls held by Moody's
but not allowed to ask questions. The people at Moody's were polite
about their brush-off, however. The C.E.O. even invited Eisman and
his team to his office for a visit in June 2007. By then, Eisman
was so certain that the world had been turned upside down that he
just assumed this guy must know it too. "But we're sitting
there," Daniel recalls, "and he says to us, like he actually
means it, ‘I truly believe that our rating will prove accurate.'
And Steve shoots up in his chair and asks, ‘What did you just say?'
as if the guy had just uttered the most preposterous statement in
the history of finance. He repeated it. And Eisman just laughed
at him."
"With
all due respect, sir," Daniel told the C.E.O. deferentially
as they left the meeting, "you're delusional."
This wasn't
Fitch or even S&P. This was Moody's, the aristocrats of the
rating business, 20 percent owned by Warren Buffett. And the company's
C.E.O. was being told he was either a fool or a crook by one Vincent
Daniel, from Queens.
Eisman,
Daniel, and Moses then flew out to Las Vegas for an even bigger
subprime conference. By now, Eisman knew everything he needed to
know about the quality of the loans being made. He still didn't
fully understand how the apparatus worked, but he knew that Wall
Street had built a doomsday machine. He was at once opportunistic
and outraged.
Their first
stop was a speech given by the C.E.O. of Option One, the mortgage
originator owned by H&R Block. When the guy got to the part
of his speech about Option One's subprime-loan portfolio, he claimed
to be expecting a modest default rate of 5 percent. Eisman raised
his hand. Moses and Daniel sank into their chairs. "It wasn't
a Q&A," says Moses. "The guy was giving a speech.
He sees Steve's hand and says, ‘Yes?'"
"Would
you say that 5 percent is a probability or a possibility?" Eisman asked.
A probability,
said the C.E.O., and he continued his speech.
Eisman had
his hand up in the air again, waving it around. Oh, no, Moses thought.
"The one thing Steve always says," Daniel explains, "is
you must assume they are lying to you. They will always lie to you."
Moses and Daniel both knew what Eisman thought of these subprime
lenders but didn't see the need for him to express it here in this
manner. For Eisman wasn't raising his hand to ask a question. He
had his thumb and index finger in a big circle. He was using his
fingers to speak on his behalf. Zero! they said.
"Yes?"
the C.E.O. said, obviously irritated. "Is that another question?"
"No,"
said Eisman. "It's a zero. There is zero probability that your
default rate will be 5 percent." The losses on subprime loans
would be much, much greater. Before the guy could reply, Eisman's
cell phone rang. Instead of shutting it off, Eisman reached into
his pocket and answered it. "Excuse me," he said, standing
up. "But I need to take this call." And with that, he
walked out.
His dinner
companion in Las Vegas ran a fund of about $15 billion and managed
C.D.O.'s backed by the BBB tranche of a mortgage bond, or as Eisman
puts it, "the equivalent of three levels of dog shit lower
than the original bonds."
FrontPoint
had spent a lot of time digging around in the dog shit and knew
that the default rates were already sufficient to wipe out this
guy's entire portfolio. "God, you must be having a hard time," Eisman told his dinner companion.
"No,"
the guy said, "I've sold everything out."
Whatever
rising anger Eisman felt was offset by the man's genial disposition.
Not only did he not mind that Eisman took a dim view of his C.D.O.'s;
he saw it as a basis for friendship. "Then he said something
that blew my mind," Eisman tells me. "He says, ‘I love
guys like you who short my market. Without you, I don't have anything
to buy.' "
That's when
Eisman finally got it. Here he'd been making these side bets with
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without
fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets.
Now he saw. There weren't enough Americans with shitty credit taking
out loans to satisfy investors' appetite for the end product. The
firms used Eisman's bet to synthesize more of them. Here, then,
was the difference between fantasy finance and fantasy football:
When a fantasy player drafts Peyton Manning, he doesn't create a
second Peyton Manning to inflate the league's stats. But when Eisman
bought a credit-default swap, he enabled Deutsche Bank to create
another bond identical in every respect but one to the original.
The only difference was that there was no actual homebuyer or borrower.
The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and
others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was
paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact,
there was no mortgage at all. "They weren't satisfied getting
lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they
couldn't afford," Eisman says. "They were creating them
out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! That's why the losses
are so much greater than the loans. But that's when I realized they
needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?"
Steve Eisman
had virtually no respect for the large Wall Street firms, particularly
Merrill Lynch. His speech below is reminiscent of Tom Joad's memorable
"I'll be there" dialogue in The
Grapes of Wrath:
"We
have a simple thesis," Eisman explained. "There is going
to be a calamity, and whenever there is a calamity, Merrill is there."
When it came time to bankrupt Orange County with bad advice, Merrill
was there. When the internet went bust, Merrill was there. Way back
in the 1980s, when the first bond trader was let off his leash and
lost hundreds of millions of dollars, Merrill was there to take
the hit. That was Eisman's logic - the logic of Wall Street's pecking
order. Goldman Sachs was the big kid who ran the games in this neighborhood.
Merrill Lynch was the little fat kid assigned the least pleasant
roles, just happy to be a part of things. The game, as Eisman saw
it, was Crack the Whip. He assumed Merrill Lynch had taken its assigned
place at the end of the chain.
As the financial
system crashed on September 18, 2008 and the protagonists of the
story became rich beyond all belief, there was no joy. They weren't
happy that they had been proven right. They were disgusted by the
entire Wall Street culture. Michael Burry shut down his fund in
disgust with his ungrateful investors. The system broke and the
Wall Street gamblers should have paid the consequences. Instead,
the US taxpayer bailed them out. In the twenty years since Lewis
had written Liar's Poker, Wall Street became greedier, nastier,
more corrupt, more arrogant and more incompetent. He traced the
biggest financial disaster in history back to his old boss John
Gutfreund. His decision to convert Salomon Brothers from a private
partnership to a public corporation opened Pandora's Box. The other
Wall Street partnerships followed like lemmings. The risk of failure
was shifted from the partners to the shareholders and the citizens
of the United States. Lewis details this fateful decision:
From that
moment, though, the Wall Street firm became a black box. The shareholders
who financed the risks had no real understanding of what the risk
takers were doing, and as the risk-taking grew ever more complex,
their understanding diminished. The moment Salomon Brothers demonstrated
the potential gains to be had by the investment bank as public corporation,
the psychological foundations of Wall Street shifted from trust
to blind faith.
No investment
bank owned by its employees would have levered itself 35 to 1 or
bought and held $50 billion in mezzanine C.D.O.'s. I doubt any partnership
would have sought to game the rating agencies or leap into bed with
loan sharks or even allow mezzanine C.D.O.'s to be sold to its customers.
The hoped-for short-term gain would not have justified the long-term
hit.
This decision
unhinged the concept of risk from the concept of return. Compensation
was no longer tied to long-term profits and success. Clients were
no longer the customer. They were just fee-generating suckers. Wall
Street kept all the profits, took ungodly risks, lost trillions
and got bailed out by Main Street. The poker game continues, as
these criminals are again paying themselves billions in bonuses
at the expense of Main Street. Michael Lewis completes the 20-year
circle of greed with his brilliant book:
"The
people in a position to resolve the financial crisis were, of course,
the very same people who had failed to foresee it. All shared a
distinction: they had proven far less capable of grasping basic
truths in the heart of the U.S. financial system than a one-eyed
money manager with Asperger's syndrome. ... The world's most powerful
and most highly paid financiers had been entirely discredited; without
government intervention every single one of them would have lost
his job; and yet these same financiers were using the government
to enrich themselves."
CAST OF
CHARACTERS
STEVE EISMAN - Manager of FrontPoint Financial Services hedge fund, which was
owned by Morgan Stanley. During the financial crisis he wished he
could have shorted Morgan Stanley. "Even on Wall Street people think
he's rude and obnoxious and aggressive," says Eisman's wife. "He
has no interest in manners. He's not tactically rude. He's sincerely
rude. He knows everyone thinks of him as a character but he doesn't
think of himself that way. Steven lives inside his head." "The
upper classes in this country raped this country. You fucked people.
You built a castle to rip people off. Not once in all these years
have I come across a person inside a big Wall Street firm who was
having a crisis of conscience. Nobody ever said ‘This is wrong'."
Eisman understood Wall Street thoroughly: "What I learned from that
experience was that Wall Street didn't give a shit what it sold."
MICHAEL
BURRY - One-eyed doctor turned investment manager who discovered
he had Asperger's Syndrome during his quest to be proven right about
subprime mortgages being worthless. He figured it out in 2003 by
himself. Burry had been "the first investor to diagnose the
disorder in the American financial system. Complicated financial
stuff was being dreamed up for the sole purpose of lending money
to people who could never repay it."
STEVE LIPPMAN - Took Michael Burry's idea about shorting subprime mortgages and
sold it across Wall Street in order to hedge Deutsche Bank's own
subprime portfolio. "I love Greg," said one of his bosses at Deutsche
Bank. "I have nothing bad to say about him except that he's a fucking
whack job." A trader who worked near him for years referred to him
as "the asshole known as Greg Lippman."
HOWIE HUBLER - Single-handedly lost $9 billion for Morgan Stanley with one trade.
He was the ultimate Big Swinging Dick as the head of mortgage bond
trading who made $25 million the year he lost the $9 billion. CEO
John Mack had no clue what his bond traders were doing. Hubler went
on vacation and never came back.
May
12, 2010
Jim
Quinn [send him mail]
is Senior Director of Strategic Planning at an Ivy League university.
This article reflects the personal views of Jim Quinn. It does not
necessarily represent the views of his employer, and is not sponsored
or endorsed by them.
|