Iran and Coercive Diplomacy
Rahul Mahajan

In general, I hate writing about Iran; the whole endless mess of coverage about Iran's nuclear programs and speculation about whether we're crazy enough to bomb them is about as enlightening as reading about the latest suicide car bombing in Iraq.

Unfortunately, just such an atmosphere of boredom and supersaturation is the least conducive to actually understanding what's going on and what's at stake.

So, the Iranian nuclear issue, in a nutshell. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires it not to develop nuclear weapons and to conduct declared peaceful nuclear programs under a series of safeguards enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Enforcement under the NPT is noncoercive and is predicated on voluntary cooperation between signatories.

Because of the nature of these enforcement protocols, it's not difficult to develop a nuclear program on the side; Iraq did in the 1980's, and the IAEA was unaware of its extent until the enhanced weapons inspection regime put into place after the 1991 Gulf War.

For these reasons, at the insistence of the United States, something called the Additional Protocol, which would enable IAEA inspectors to check for undeclared nuclear facilities by requesting access to various physical locations, scientists and technicians, and documentation, was added to the NPT. In 2003, Iran agreed voluntarily to submit to its provisions.

As a result, IAEA inspectors were able to find out a great deal that had not been known before. But this was of course not good enough for the United States, and in 2006 it succeeded in pushing the Security Council to approve sanctions against Iran (Resolutions 1737 and 1747), in addition to implementing some of its own.

The Iraq experience has taught members of the Security Council to trust the United States as far as they can throw it, and so 1737 and 1747 are very carefully worded. Although they invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the part governing the use of force, they stick to Article 41 of Chapter VII, which involves only nonviolent actions. They want the resolutions to have teeth, but they don't want to take the slightest chance that the United States could claim the resolutions authorize it to bomb Iran.

Those resolutions went beyond the provisions of the NPT, requiring Iran to stop uranium enrichment, something that's necessary for nuclear reactors as well as bombs.

Iran's reaction was predictable; it stepped up efforts at enrichment and also terminated cooperation under the Additional Protocol. Ahmadinejad, Bush-like, told the world that the resolutions were just "pieces of paper."

The latest IAEA report on Iranian compliance, dated November 15, is mixed. On the one hand, it verifies that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and that uranium is being enriched only to 4% U-235, enough for a reactor but far short of bomb-grade. The report is reasonably pleased with Iranian cooperation, although it notes that it expects more access to individuals and documents within the next few weeks.

On the other, it notes that suspension of Additional Protocol measures mean it has declining ability to assess whether Iran has undeclared programs. It also notes that Iran, goaded by the Security Council resolutions, has increased by a factor of 10 its number of centrifuges, for use in enrichment.

The contents have been badly misreported in the U.S. press, most of which is as eye-glazed as the rest of us over Iranian nuclear activities, and perhaps slightly more inclined than most of us to accept State Department characterizations unexamined.

The Bush administration reportedly will seek stricter sanctions from the U.N., to go along with its new raft of belligerent measures against the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and anyone who deals with them.

Of course, the lesson from the IAEA report is blindingly obvious. Even if Iran isn't interested in building a bomb, it's even less interested in backing down under U.S. coercion - and it feels no need to with the U.S. bogged down in Iraq, oil at $95 a barrel, and almost nobody in the world taking the Bush administration seriously.

Except for Hillary Clinton, the Democratic candidates seem to understand that the ham-handed approach of the current administration won't work. What most of them don't seem to understand is that even a kinder, gentler, smooth-tongued (Bill) Clintonesque coercion won't work either - and is increasingly unlikely to work with any of the problems we will face. What will be needed is - dare I say it - actual diplomacy.

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